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Husserl’s Transcendental Turn as an Expression of Brentano’s 
Scholasticism 
 
 
It appears as a well-known fact that Edmund Husserl, in his later philosophy, fell victim to 
the sort of idealism unheard of since Berkeley. According to Roman Ingarden in On the 
Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, for instance, only Husserl’s emphasis 
of the transcendence of the material object distinguishes his idealism from that of the 
Bishop’s.1 
 In this paper, I posit that Husserl’s transcendental turn is not really a turn, and not 
really idealism; that is, it isn’t idealism in the sense of idealism that we tend to 
automatically dismiss as metaphysically unsatisfying. Rather, it is a logical inference of his 
taking seriously the distinction between mental and physical phenomena as presented in 
Brentano’s Scholastic-inspired statement of the intentionality of consciousness in 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. (Husserl cites this definition in Cartesian 
Meditations §40 “Transition to the question of transcendental idealism”.) Certainly, Husserl 
makes some very questionable statements in Ideas; however, his subsequent work 
attempting to explain transcendental idealism should not be ignored. That is, we cannot (as 
Ingarden does) take Ideas as the authoritative source of Husserl’s concept of 
transcendental idealism. Later works suggest an interpretation that is more metaphysically 
satisfying (to borrow a phrase from Edith Stein). And what is evident in the later works is 
that Husserl does not see these explanations as revision; rather, his later statements are 
framed more as attempts to express himself correctly, and specifically Brentano’s reference 
to the Medieval philosophers, whom he credits with the concept of intentionality. That is 
not to say, however, that Husserl now has recourse to the same explanatory metaphysics as 
Aristotle and the Scholastics did. Husserl’s transcendental idealism, in the end, falls victim 
to another pitfall; he, in comparison to the Scholastic and Aristotelian concepts by which 
Brentano was inspired, reverses the relation of abstraction, which calls into question the 
intentional inexistence of the intentional object.  
 
Husserl’s Idea-lism 
 
“Idealism” is a scary word. It conjures up images of the Bishop Berkeley denying the 
existence of external reality and positing that the world exists only for someone, and that 
someone must be God. There are quite a few concepts involved in Berkeley’s idealism that 
are metaphysically unsatisfying, starting with this confident assertion in the inexistence of 
material reality, and ending with his attempt to resolve the difficulties that arise from this 
assertion with reference to the idea that we and all of our ideas are only ideas in the mind 
of a higher power that creates as it perceives.2  
                                                                   
1 Roman Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, tr. Arnór Hannibalsson [The 
Hague; Martinus Nihjoff, 1975], pp. 32-3. 
2 George Berkeley, Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Johnathan Bennet, page. 1: “I seriously 
believe that there is no such thing as what philosophers call ‘material substance’; but if I were made to see 
anything absurd or sceptical in this, then I would have the same reason to renounce this belief as I think I 
have now to reject the contrary opinion.” Also page 51: “It is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction to 
suppose, that any unthinking being should exist without being perceived by a mind. And if this view is found to be 
To associate Husserl’s idealism with the name of Berkeley casts shame on the 
discipline of phenomenology. Yet when Ingarden describes Husserl’s transcendental 
idealism, he claims that it is distinguished from Berkeley’s only through emphasis, a 
distinction which surely does not distance Husserl from Berkeley to a great enough extent:  
 
By this emphasis on transcendence of material things in relation to the 
experiences of perceptions in which they are given, Husser’s idealistic solution 
is different from other ‘idealisms’ e.g. that of Berkeley3 
  
But this ‘transcendence’ does not seem satisfying. Rather, the way Ingarden frames 
Husserl’s idealism is as a kind of Berkeleyan idealism that, instead of making the material 
world non-existent, makes it transcendent. The metaphysics are unsatisfying because there 
doesn’t seem to be a way to differentiate between these two states of affairs, and we come 
away from Ingarden’s interpretation of Husserl thinking of the latter as a sort of jargony 
Berkeleyan. 
 Indeed, Husserl makes the statements upon which Ingarden chooses to focus his 
criticism. In On the Motives, Ingarden claims that, for Husserl, beyond consciousness the 
material world is nothing: 
 
the material things given in perception and thought in the cognitive acts 
superstructured over perception are not an autonomous (separate in relation to 
conscious experiences) sphere of autonomous being in itself; they are only 
something that exists in its essence “for” the conscious subject performing the 
perceptive acts. They are only intentional units of sense and beyond that “ein 
Nichts” (nothing).4 
 
Which is pretty much exactly what Husserl states in Ideas: 
 
On the other hand, the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being 
and the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a 
merely intentional being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for 
a consciousness. It is a being posited by consciousness in its experiences which, 
of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as belonging to 
motivated multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing.5 
 
Given that this is intended as one of the fundamental tenets of transcendental 
phenomenology, it seems that Husserl is doomed to live in infamy with Bishop Berkeley. As 
early as 1918, however, i.e., just about the time Ingarden started publishing work explicitly 
criticizing the concept of transcendental idealism, Husserl seemed to have done some work 
toward correcting this ill-conceived association. Stein writes to Ingarden on June 24, 1918, 
that Husserl seems ready to “lay his cards on the table about idealism”, that he has 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
strange, it is a shame that it should be so in our age and in a Christian country.” 
3 Ingarden, On the Motives, pp. 32-3. 
4 Ibid, 32. 
5 Edmund Husserl, Ideas, tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson [New York: Collier Books, 1962], p. 112. 
explained to her a sense of transcendental idealism that is “metaphysically satisfying”, 
though she notes that,  
 
Much of what is presently in Ideen has to be composed differently, though in 
Husserl’s sense, if only he brings together what he has, and in a critical moment 
does not leave out of consideration something that necessarily belongs to the 
subject. (I think, for example, of the recasting of the concept of consciousness 
that results from a consideration of the constitution of consciousness—
something you also wish.6 
 
She doubts, in the letter, whether Husserl will ever be able to express his ideas as a 
synthesis, for “the Master is tired”; she characterizes Husserl as wanting to discuss 
every point in exacting detail without ever bringing them together. (The letter gives 
the impression that Husserl has gotten rather rambly.) 
 Still, Husserl continues to extol the virtues of transcendental idealism, if only it 
were to be understood correctly. This was, according to Ingarden, his purpose in 
writing the Cartesian Meditations, though Ingarden also claims that Husserl was never 
satisfied with the work. We can infer that Ingarden, too, was not satisfied with its 
content, as his criticisms of Husserl’s idealism continue well after the Meditations. 
Indeed, Ingarden seems rather dismissive of the work as a whole, stating in a footnote 
in On the Motives that: 
 
These Meditations are known to have been occasioned by external 
circumstances, an invitation to lecture in Paris. Husserl was not satisfied with 
them. For many years after they were published in a French translation Husserl 
intended to publish them in German and worked on a new version which, as he 
wrote to me in a letter, was to become his main work. This work was to contain 
the elaboration of the totality of problems and fundamental theses of 
transcendental phenomenology. Unfortunately, this plan was never realized.7 
 
It’s unfortunate that the detractor’s of Husserl’s idealism continue to read him as he 
presents himself in Ideas, since there are hints in the Meditations as to how one can redeem 
transcendental idealism, at least to definitively separate it from the idealism of Berkeley. 
The more metaphysically satisfying interpretation of transcendental idealism, I posit, 
involves an incorporation of a version of the medieval concept of intentional existence to 
which Brentano refers. Husserl’s transcendental idealism, on the other hand, suffers exactly 
as much as it is being interpreted against a background of modern philosophy, a problem to 
which he himself contributes to the point of subsuming his putative redemption under the 
name Cartesian.  
 
The Problem with Husserl and Modern Philosophy 
 
                                                                   
6 Edith Stein, Letters to Roman Ingarden, tr. Hugh Candler Hunt [Washington: ICS, 2005], p. 110. 
7 Ingarden, On the Motives, page 2 footnote. 
Our interpretation of Husserl as a damnable idealist lies precisely in the overflow of 
concepts from modern philosophers, that remain as prejudices within contemporary 
philosophy. Two concepts in particular, against which Jeff Mitscherling provides an explicit 
argument in Aesthetic Genesis,8 are the ideas that a substance is a kind of “stuff” and that 
concepts are something that we “have”. It is obvious that Berkeley exemplifies the latter 
concept in his assertions that ideas, i.e., things themselves, are ideas “in” a mind. Rather, 
ideas are not something we “have” in the sense of the mind as a bag of ideas, but things we 
think. Without the former assumption, that substances are kinds of stuff, we may not even 
assume that realism and idealism are opposed.  
 Ingarden, in the introduction to Controversy over the Existence of the World, traces 
the problem back to Descartes, who he says, “made a vital contribution toward generating 
the controversy over the existence of the world”.9 “Starting with him,” Ingarden continues,  
 
and indeed through Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and the Neo-Kantian idealists, all the 
way to the transcendental idealists of our times, the conviction became 
increasingly more entrenched that not only does the problem of the existence 
and nature of the real world follow from epistemological reflections, but that at 
bottom it is itself an empistemological problem.10 
  
Ingarden, essentially, is blaming Descartes and those working within the Cartesian 
framework, for rephrasing a metaphysical question as an epistemological one. Yet, when 
Ingarden states his presuppositions for embarking on the project of the book, he takes as 
his starting point the transcendental idealism of Husserl. Specifically, Ingarden takes as a 
starting point the presupposition that, “At least two realms of being are to be distinguished 
for individual entities: the realm of pure consciousness and the real world.”11 He points to 
Husserl’s distinction in the Ideas between the objects of the “real” world and the irreal 
intentional objects of consciousness. This problem, that of defining distinct mental and 
extramental realms, only one of which can be real, begins with Descartes and is present in 
both Husserl’s Ideas and Ingarden’s criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism as a 
whole. That is, Ingarden’s trouble with Husserl’s idealism remains a reaction to the Ideas, 
with which there are certainly problems, and resistant to Husserl’s attempt to reconcile 
those problems in Cartesian Meditations, to which Ingarden refers to in a footnote to his 
Introduction12 only to indicate that Husserl recognized the problems he is pointing towards 
and made some attempt to resolve them. The implication, given that Ingarden does not 
integrate the Cartesian Meditations into his exposition, is that the concepts therein remain 
entirely unsatisfactory.  
 Husserl, responding to Ingarden’s critique, instead refers to the new system of 
ontology he claims to provide a preface of in Meditations, as a “total revolution”. Were 
Ingarden only to understand the new way which, Husserl admits in the letter, dated 
                                                                   
8 See “The Negative Lexicon” in Jeff Mitscherling, Aesthetic Genesis [New York: University Press of America, 
2009] 
9 Roman Ingarden, Controversy over the Existence of the World, Vol. 1, tr. Arthur Szylewicz [New York: Peter 
Lang, 2013], p. 29 
10 Ibid., 30. 
11 Ibid., 33. 
12 Footnote 49, p. 36. 
November 13, 1931, is not fully elucidated in Cartesian Meditations, he would no longer be 
able to interpret him under the old framework. The new phenomenology does have 
metaphysical implications, and (Husserl claims) Ingarden has not grasped them. He writes:  
 
Admittedly, an actual systematic presentation and the outline of the further 
problematic—the system of a phen[omenological] metaphysics is not carried 
out there. But once raised up to the new ground, you would indeed understand 
what can and must be meant there, have the eyes to see for yourself. Then you 
couldn’t pursue ontology in the old way.13  
 
Husserl, however, despite his confidence that the new way of ontology is, in fact, 
revolutionary, still falls victim to the habit of doing things in the old way. The irony here is 
that in rejecting the old way, Husserl moves transcendental idealism closer to an even older 
way—rejecting some of the premises of modern philosophy, Husserl adopts instead some 
aspects of the Scholastic conception of intentionality, in order to resolve some of the 
problems with the opposition between realism and idealism, and to establish the unity of 
objects with objects of consciousness.  
 
Intentional Inexistence 
 
 Brentano’s original statement of the distinction between mental and physical 
phenomena depends on a concept of “intentional inexistence”14. Husserl cites this 
definition in Cartesian Meditations §40 “Transition to the question of transcendental 
idealism”, as an example of how we might try to solve the problem of the relation of 
consciousness to the external world. He decides, in the end, that the question makes no 
sense. The world of consciousness and the external world “belong together essentially; and, 
as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one”.15 It makes no sense to 
Husserl why we would try to establish the connection between them according to some 
“rigid law”. I believe this is a Scholastic revival. When Brentano refers to the Scholastics, he 
means to point toward the distinction made by Medieval scholars between the modes of 
being of the essence of a thing, which may have any of material, quidditive, or cognitive 
being. The problem being dealt with by Duns Scotus, for instance, as he grapples with the 
question of how a universal exists in Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,16 is how the 
universal can exist as one and in the many, i.e., how the essence of a thing can be both in a 
thing and in thought and remain numerically identical (a consequence of Aristotle’s 
                                                                   
13 Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, ed. R. Ingarden [The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968]. The passage 
appears in Jeff Mitscherling, Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics [Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 
1997], p. 45. 
14 “Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the 
intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, 
reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or 
immanent objectivity.” Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trs. Rancurello, Terrell and 
McAlister [New York: Routledge, 2009], p. 68 
15 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 84. 
16 VII.18 “Is a universal something in things?” 
concept of the intelligible form somehow being present in the sensible form of an object17). 
The answer is to attribute multiple modes of being to an essence (being in the thing and 
being in the intellect). As it is in the object, it is particular, and as it is in cognition, it is 
rendered universal, i.e., abstracted from the thing by the agent (active) intellect of Aristotle.  
 The numerical identity between the multiple modes of being of an essence is, I posit, 
what Husserl is thinking when he writes that the universe and our knowledge of it “belong 
together essentially; and as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one”18. 
It is a retention of Brentano’s (originally, Aristotelian) conception of the active intellect’s 
abstracting the object of consciousness from its material counterpart and thereby giving 
the intentional object the property of intentional inexistence. All this means is that the 
intentional object and its material counterpart are different in being—while the essence is 
in the material, the mind thinks of it as separate, i.e., as it is not; without that distinction 
there would be no differentia defining the difference between physical and mental 
phenomena. The “inexistence” of the object of consciousness is only an intentional 
inexistence, the result of intentionality’s taking a physical phenomenon and rendering it 
mental, and it does not follow from this specification that physical objects do not exist. As 
McCormick writes in Modernity, Aesthetics and the Bounds of Art, Brentano owes this 
concept to Aquinas, whose theory of cognition is entirely Aristotelian.19 Husserl’s revision 
of Brentano’s concept of intentionality, such that he emphasizes the constitutive aspect of 
an intentional act, seems to eliminate the possibility of an external world, while the 
Scholastic concept of intentionality Brentano adopts does not.  
 While Husserl attempts to reduce the force of his statements in Ideas to that effect, 
his revisions to phenomenology apparent in the Cartesian Meditations, while explicitly 
claiming that he is not subject to criticisms of old-style idealism, still ground the entirety of 
reality in the transcendental ego. That is, while he seems to revise his earlier bold 
statements about the existence of the external world to fall more in line with Brentano’s 
Scholasticism, he still comes off as a proto-Cartesian, only replacing Descartes’ cogito with 
the transcendental ego. He claims, at the end of the Meditations, that while we lose the 
world by performing the epoché, we subsequently regain it through “universal self-
examination.”20 
 Husserl has, with his emphasis on the grounding of everything within the 
transcendental ego, in fact reversed the Aristotelian concept of cognition, carried through 
Aquinas and the Scholastics through to Brentano’s concept of intentionality. Specifically, he 
reverses what it is that is abstracted from what in the act of cognition. For Aristotle and 
Aquinas, the universal is abstracted from the phantasmata to become an object of thought; 
objects of thought, therefore, are dependent on the existence of things, i.e., these things that 
cause the phantasmata, from which we abstract. Husserl, on the other hand, in the fifth 
meditation, characterizes the process of abstraction as beginning with one’s own 
                                                                   
17 Aristotle, De Anima 431b12-17: “The so-called abstract objects the mind thinks just as, in the case of the 
snub, one might think of it qua snub and not separately, but if anyone actually thought of it qua hollow he 
would think of it without the flesh in which it is embodied: it is thus that the mind when it is thinking the 
objects of mathematics thinks of them as separate though they are not separate.” 
18 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, tr. Dorian Cairns [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960], p. 84. 
19 See the eight articles on “How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It” 
in Summa Theologiae. 
20 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 157. 
experience, from which we might abstract both an objective world as well as other subjects. 
Beginning in the “transcendental attitude”, we abstract (according to Husserl) an objective 
world by delimiting it from “what is peculiarly my own”21. That is, we take the world, 
determine whatever it is that is uniquely ours, and thereby discover the differentiae 
between the subject and its world. Since the world is constituted by consciousness, the 
objective world, for Husserl, is an abstraction from the acts of consciousness. This is a 
reversal of Brentano’s Scholastic/Aristotelian view of cognition, where objects suitable to 
thought are abstracted from a world. In thinking of an object in an objective reality as 
opposed to an intentional object, we are thinking of objects as they are not, for Husserl; that 
is, as objects not of consciousness. 
 That is how particulars, those things that exist in the world and constitute nature, 
have only a secondary existence for Husserl.22 The objects (as intentional object) is a  
“transcendental clue” whereby we may become aware of the preconditions of its existence. 
Without the transcendental ego existing as a precondition, they would not be objects, an 
object being an abstraction from an object-for-us, i.e., through objectivation. Husserl, in 
reversing the direction of abstraction, now cannot appeal to the mere intentional 
inexistence of the objects of consciousness in order not to preclude the existence of a 
world. The world itself, as abstracted, would be what is intentionally inexistent. Working 
out what this means, however, results in a more metaphysically satisfying concept of 
transcendental idealism. 
 For both Husserl and the Scholastics, so-called real and ideal objects are unified, that 
according to which they are unified differs. While the abstracted essence of an object, for 
the Scholastics, has an intentional inexistence (in the sense that its inexistence is just a 
result of its being abstracted from an existent object), Husserl cannot appeal to the same 
notion in the same way. Husserl attempts to resolve the realism-idealism debate by 
unifying the real and ideal realms; both of these realms, he claims are existent. However, 
they are also both products of a transcendental subjectivity. He writes that, “Precisely 
thereby every sort of existent itself, real or ideal, becomes understandable as a ‘product’ of 
transcendental subjectivity, a product constituted in just that [i.e., knowledge] 
performance.”23 While the Scholastic would attribute intentional inexistence to the 
intentional essence, i.e., that which is abstracted from the world, Husserl’s reversal of what 
is abstracted from what would attribute intentional inexistence to the objective world 
itself. Husserl’s notion of the secondary existence of nature is a reflection of this reversal, 
but a secondary existence, like intentional inexistence, does not preclude existence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Husserl’s solution to the realism-idealism problem, I maintain, is more metaphysically 
satisfying than Ingarden’s evaluation suggests. The object and the object of consciousness 
have some metaphysical concept to explain their unification, which moves Husserl’s 
idealism well-beyond that of the modern period. Husserl is, in the Meditations, no longer 
                                                                   
21 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 95. 
22 “Natural being is a realm whose existential status [Seinsgeltung] is secondary; it continually presupposes 
the realm of transcendental being.” Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 21. 
23 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 85. 
emphasizing the irreality of the intentional object. At the same time, the foundation of 
everything that exists is still the subject, transcendental as it may be. Still, the fact that the 
objective world is abstracted from the acts of consciousness does not preclude its 
existence, and this is true to exactly the same extent that to abstract a universal from a 
particular, in the Scholastic conception of abstraction, does not preclude its existence.  
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